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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the link between “natural“ disasters and politics. 
It argues that due to its broader perspective on the political, 
anthropological perspectives have been more attentive to this link than 
other disciplines like political science. It is pointed out that disaster 
vulnerability often derives from political conditions. Foucault’s 
concept of governmentality, “the art of governing populations”, is 
useful to analyze the link between politics and disasters. Disasters are, 
in fact, a relatively recent area into which governmentality has spread. 
Not long ago, disasters were regarded in many cases simply as fateful 
events, totally outside  the control and responsibility of state and 
government. In Pakistan, for instance, a specialized institution for 
dealing with natural disasters, the National Disaster Management 
Authority (NDMA) has been established only in consequence of the 
2005 earthquake.  
In a post-disaster situation the confrontation of the affected people 
with instruments and strategies of governmentality - whether 
employed by the state or by NGOs - multiplies. The reverse of 
governmentality is that citizens hold the state responsible for almost 
all areas of life, including disasters and the (in)effective mitigation of 
their consequences. For affected citizens, disasters may thus become 
an opportunity to express discontent and to protest against what is 
perceived as inadequate and insufficient efforts for relief or 
reconstruction. Thus, post-disaster situations easily become sites of 
political contestation. For the anthropology of the state disaster 
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situations then provide unique opportunities to dissect conventional 
images of the state as a huge, powerful and monolithic entity. In other 
disaster situations the state may virtually disappear from the scene, 
leaving the field to national or international non-governmental 
organizations. Relations between NGOs and the affected people are 
“political” and structured by issues of power, too.  
Two case studies are presented to analyze relations between politics 
and disasters: the massive rock avalanche that struck the Callejón the 
Huaylas in Peru in May 1970 and the much smaller Attabad landslide 
which hit Hunza in Northern Pakistan in January 2010. It is concluded 
that disasters are political and that any study of disasters that 
disregards their entanglement with power relations and political action 
misses an important dimension without which disaster situations 
cannot be fully understood. 
 
Introduction1
 
What do natural disasters have to do with politics? At first sight 
it might seem that there is no link: Disasters like earthquakes or 
tsunamis simply strike in some places, irrespective of 
governments or political relations. Yet the discussion of 
disasters has convincingly pointed out that no disaster is just 
“natural”.2 Disasters may be triggered by natural events (i.e. 
events that occur without human intervention), but they take 
place in human social spaces and social spaces are always 
inherently political.  
Still, political scientist Richard Olson (2008, cf. 
Hannigan 2012: 7) diagnoses for his discipline that it is largely 
inattentive to disasters. Political science regarded disasters 
mostly as “engineering problems” but not as “political 
 
1 This is the revised version of a paper which was originally presented 
at the “Anthropology of Disasters Research School” at the National 
Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, in 
March 2012. I am very grateful to the German Academic Exchange 
Service (DAAD) for generously funding the Research School.  
2 On the problem of defining “natural disasters” and the problematic 
category of the “natural” see Oliver-Smith 1999 and Perry and 
Qurantelli 2005. 
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occasions”. And if the discipline pays attention to disasters, it is 
mostly to disaster policies (Olson 2008: 154); not to actual 
events and practices in the context of disasters.3 Craig Calhoun 
(2004) calls this a de-politicizing managerial perspective. Yet 
Olson argues that political science should be very attentive to 
disasters: “Disasters constitute ‘exogenous shocks’ to which 
modern political systems must respond, so it should not come as 
a surprise therefore that literally within minutes after any major 
impact, disasters start becoming political. The politicization of 
the event then only increases as the affected community, or at 
times an entire society, moves from emergency response 
through the recovery and reconstruction phases” (2008: 155). As 
a political scientist, Olson’s concept of politics is centered on 
government and he argues that governments need not only to 
manage a disaster situation but also to explain it (ibid.). A large 
part of disaster politics, therefore, refers to “blame 
management” (p. 162). He concludes: “Disasters often strip 
away layers of semantic, symbolic, and process cover to provide 
clear insights into the nature, priorities, and capabilities of 
authorities, governments and entire regimes. They are deeply, 
deeply political” (p. 167). 
Social anthropological perspectives on disasters are 
slightly different; probably also because anthropology holds a 
much broader concept of “the political”. Not focusing more or 
less exclusively on state and government anthropologists find 
politics, understood as power relations and efforts to manipulate 
power, in all areas of life. Anthropology has always been very 
interested in local level politics, i.e. in local negotiations of 
power relations, for instance in a village or neighborhood 
context. Anthropologists ask questions like who has the power 
to make what decision or what alliances are formed in the 
pursuit of certain interests. Compared to political scientists, 
                                                 
3 Also Hannigan (2012) focusses on disaster policies, if on global 
scale.  
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anthropologists today also focus more on political practices and 
action than on structures and organization. A broad concept of 
politics is closely related to a broad understanding of power. If 
we follow Michel Foucault, Alain Touraine and others,4 power 
is an inherent aspect of all social relations. Politics and power 
are about making decisions and there are many decisions to be 
made in situations of disaster. Thus, disasters have to be seen as 
eminently political situations.  
 
Vulnerability and Politics 
 
Richard Olson’s framing of the relationship between disasters 
and politics refers exclusively to the post-disaster situation. Yet 
a less restricted understanding would point out that a disaster 
does not simply commence with some physical impact. 
According to Alexander (2000), disasters are cyclical processes 
and the post-disaster situation eventually feeds into a pre-
disaster situation which to a large extent determines the 
consequences of an impact. It has become common sense in 
disaster research that not all people are equally affected by given 
impact, that is, they are differently vulnerable in a disaster 
situation. The concept of vulnerability is a political ecological 
concept that “blends a focus on the relationship that people have 
with their environment with close attention to the political 
economic forces characteristic of the society in which they live 
that shape and condition that relationship” (Oliver-Smith 2007: 
10). In disaster research, the concept of vulnerability marks the 
shift away from the dominant paradigm that focused on the 
control of physical hazard agents (Hewitt 1983).   
Vulnerability theory presupposes that certain conditions 
of persons or the social environment reduce or enhance people’s 
susceptibility to damages by the impact of a physical event. 
Gender and class are regularly quoted as variables that strongly 
 
4 Foucault 1982, Touraine 1981. 
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influence vulnerability. For instance, poor people are often more 
prone to suffer death or severe material damage from an 
earthquake because they cannot afford earthquake-proof 
construction and often reside in unsafe places like on steep 
slopes. Similarly, women are frequently seen as being 
particularly vulnerable because generally they command fewer 
resources than men (e.g. Ariyabandu 2009). The importance of 
vulnerability resulting from a lack of access to resources in 
disaster analysis has been strongly advocated by Piers Blaikie et 
al. (1994). Yet Middleton and O’Keefe argue that Blaikie and 
colleagues essentially presented a circular argument: “People are 
vulnerable because they are poor and lack resources, and 
because they are poor and lack resources they are vulnerable” 
(Middleton & O’Keefe 1998: 12). They emphasize instead that 
vulnerability is basically produced by political conditions of 
local or global scale. According to them the unequal distribution 
of power is at the roots of unequal social conditions, unequal 
gender relations included, which result in differential 
vulnerability to disasters. Similarly, Anthony Oliver-Smith aptly 
writes about the hazards of domination. He argues that “social, 
political and economic power relations are inscribed through 
material practices (construction, urban planning or 
transportation) in the modified and built environments, and one 
of the many ways in which they are refracted back into daily 
living is the form of conditions of vulnerability. In general, 
environmental security is a premium enjoyed predominately by 
the beneficiaries of the social relations of production and 
distribution” (Oliver-Smith 2007: 16). In the last instance, the 
emphasis on the political roots of vulnerability questions the 
usefulness of the distinction between “natural” and “man-made” 
disasters: A physical impact and triggering event may be 
“natural”, i.e. not caused by human intervention, but its 
potentially disastrous consequences are a product of human 
social – and political – relations. 
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Disasters and Governmentality 
 
In order to analyze the relations between politics and disasters it 
is very useful to refer to Michel Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality. Governmentality is a very complex idea which 
lacks a clear definition. For Foucault, governmentality refers to 
the “art of governing populations” (Foucault 1991). Foucault 
uses the concept to point towards the ever-expanding scope of 
governing. While earlier states and governments interfered little 
in the everyday lives of most people, this interference greatly 
increased in the last three centuries. Further, the mode of 
interference changed. The interventions of state and government 
is no more limited to coercive measures like the collection of 
taxes or the conscription of soldiers but includes the “caring for 
the population” and for aspects of life which before had been 
outside of the interest and purview of the state. Education is a 
striking example in this regard: While still during the period of 
Enlightenment rulers did not care about the education of their 
subjects, education is seen as a very significant field of 
government in most states of the present. Similarly, 
governments have assumed responsibility for many other 
aspects of society like health or economy.  
Governmentality signifies a radical change in the 
purpose of government: It is no more a largely Machiavellian 
aim of securing of power for its own preservation but, at least 
rhetorically, the wellbeing of the population.  In order that a 
state or government is able to care for the wellbeing of the 
population, it has to “know” this population.  Thus, the rise of 
governmentality goes hand in hand with different kinds of new 
techniques and specialized institutions for collecting information 
and acquiring knowledge like surveys, statistics and registers. 
These also imply increasing control of the people, like 
controlling their movements or residence, but this control is 
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justified as a necessity for maintaining security, for instance, and 
is not simply understood as a form of coercion.  
Governmentality is intimately connected with a disciplining 
power that ultimately turns subjects into citizens and forms 
citizens according to the exigencies of government. Through a 
multiplication of institutions, agencies, discourses and practices, 
state and government branch out into society. The boundary 
between state and society becomes increasingly blurred (Gupta 
1995). Yet governmentality does not necessarily signify the 
strengthening of the state. Contemporary neoliberal 
governmentality, to the contrary, implies the devolution and 
decentering of the state and the transfer of many tasks and 
responsibilities that were formerly ascribed to the state to 
“private” or “non-governmental” agencies.  
Disasters are, in fact, a relatively recent area into which 
governmentality has spread. Not long ago, disasters were 
regarded in many cases simply as fateful events which were 
totally outside of the control and responsibility of state and 
government. In Pakistan, for instance, a specialized institution 
for dealing with natural disasters, the National Disaster 
Management Authority (NDMA) has been established only in 
consequence of the 2005 earthquake. Beside the state agency 
there are now innumerous non-governmental organizations in 
the country specializing in this field.  
Disasters often provide situations in which the expansion of 
governmentality accelerates and the state advances into areas of 
life which before had not been under its purview and control. In 
his analysis of the situation after the Gujarat earthquake of 2001, 
Edward Simpson (2005) shows that the large-scale destruction 
of the town Bhuj provided an opportunity for bureaucratic 
intervention by the government and especially for an 
unprecedented endeavor of “town planning” which in fact 
demolished most parts of the old city which had not been 
destroyed by the earthquake. Simpson refers to the “enlargement 
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of the state” (2005: 230) after the earthquake which affected the 
local population more existentially than ever before.   
In a post-disaster situation the confrontation of the 
affected people with instruments and strategies of 
governmentality - whether employed by the state or by NGOs - 
multiplies. They often have to undergo registration for relief or 
reconstruction, answer questionnaires or provide data for 
assessments.5  Often they are put within the confines of camps 
which exert their own rationality of “taking care” of the people.  
They are subject to educative strategies and campaigns, e.g. by 
NGOs which beside the open goal of providing relief also 
pursue the more or less hidden agenda of changing gender 
relations which they consider as being oppressive for women, or 
of some kind of Islamization. Both could be observed after the 
2005 earthquake in Azad Kashmir and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.6
To research this multiplication of encounters between 
“the people” and “the state” questions can be asked like: How 
do people encounter “the state” in disaster or post-disaster 
situations? What do they experience as “the state”? What do 
they expect from the state? How do they see and construct the 
state? And of course, what is the self-representation of the state 
in disaster situations? 
The reverse of governmentality is that citizens hold the 
state responsible for almost all areas of life. Now state and 
government cannot argue that they are not responsible for an 
earthquake or for torrential floods because these are simply 
“natural” events. They are not held responsible for an impacting 
event itself but for the effective mitigation of its consequences. 
 
5 This entails certain difficulties for disaster research. When a research 
approaches the field with some questionnaire or survey the 
respondents very often expect some material boon. 
6 The gender issue was particularly controversial for the earthquake 
affected communities in KPK. There was a famous fax sent in summer 
2007 by a Batagram jirga to a coordination committee of NGOs in 
which they told that the work of the NGOs was welcome but that they 
should not sent female personnel to the villages.  
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Organizing disaster preparedness before or the management of 
rescue, relief and reconstruction after a catastrophe are now seen 
as falling “naturally” within the responsibility of government. 
While state and government may try to take a disaster as 
opportunity for a rather positive self-representation (i.e. the state 
as caring for the citizens, government as caring for voters), 
thereby furthering the expectations in their disaster management 
capacities, affected people are often not satisfied with state and 
government performance in post-disaster situations because the 
exigencies go much beyond the available resources of a given 
state. For affected citizens, disaster may thus become an 
opportunity to express discontent and to protest against what is 
perceived as inadequate and insufficient efforts for relief or 
reconstruction. Especially opposition groups or parties may take 
the opportunity to protest against government. Thus, post-
disaster situations easily become sites of political contestation. 
For the anthropology of the state disaster situations 
provide unique opportunities to dissect conventional images of 
the state as a huge, powerful and monolithic entity. In the case 
of the earthquake in Azad Kashmir state intervention was 
channeled through a number of different and often ill-
coordinated and competing institutions which followed their 
own interests and rationalities rather than some overarching 
“state policy”. Here, the situation was further complicated by the 
condition that in fact two “states” intervened: Pakistan and Azad 
Kashmir.7 To some extent, post-earthquake policies and 
interventions became a site for the contestation of power 
between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. Yet in spite of the actual 
                                                 
7 Although nominally autonomous, Azad Kashmir is in fact largely 
controlled by Pakistan. Thus the Pakistani government and its 
Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) 
ultimately controlled the funds available for reconstruction in Azad 
Kashmir, although AJK has its own State Earthquake Reconstruction 
and Rehabilitation Agency (SERRA). In the practical dealings of the 
reconstruction efforts, however, the Azad Kashmiri officials often 
attempt to wrest some space of autonomy from the Pakistan’s sway. 
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dissolution of the state into multiplying, often contradicting and 
antagonistic agencies, practices and discourses,  a contrary 
image of the state is often produced an preserved. Thus, disaster 
situations may become excellent opportunities for the 
observation of the “state effect”, to which Timothy Mitchell 
refers: „… the state is no longer to be taken as essentially an 
actor, with the coherence, agency, and autonomy this term 
presumes. The multiple arrangements that produce the apparent 
separateness of the state create effects of agency and partial 
autonomy, with concrete consequences. Yet such agency will 
always be contingent on the production of difference – those 
practices that create the apparent boundary between state and 
society. These arrangements may be so effective, however, as to 
make things appear the reverse of this. The state comes to seem 
an autonomous starting point, as an actor that intervenes in 
society” (Mitchell 2006: 176).  
 
Non-Governmental Organizations and Disaster Politics 
 
In other disaster situations, however, the state may virtually 
disappear from the scene, leaving the field for various reasons 
like disinterest in marginal regions, lack of resources or limited 
capabilities to national or international non-governmental 
organizations. NGOs / INGOs engaged in humanitarian work 
often portray themselves as being eminently non-political, but 
from an anthropological perspective this is certainly not correct. 
Particularly INGOs are often very potent and thus powerful 
actors, measured by the resources they command and the 
opportunities they offer; sometimes their resources equal or 
even surpass those of affected states. Haiti is a case in point 
where the devastating earthquake of January 2010 hit an almost 
defunct state which already before had “survived” only because 
of massive international intervention.  Lisa Smirl (2008) aptly 
compares the massive influx of foreign NGO personnel in some 
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disaster sites with a “tsunami” and points out that their presence, 
their expensive cars, and their often securitized and separate 
accommodation may have significant effects on the targeted 
people. Most importantly, the NGO tsunami more often than not 
triggers the soaring of rents and other market rates, creating 
economic imbalances for the local population.  
On one hand NGOs allocate goods and services to local 
people and the question of who gets what is intimately entangled 
with power relations. On the other hand, NGOs rely on local 
people as brokers or intermediaries, for instance for surveys of 
loss and damage and for the identification of beneficiaries. Such 
intermediaries often become very powerful persons (or the other 
way round: powerful locals become intermediaries) as they can 
manipulate the access to the NGO’s resources. NGOs are often 
looking particularly for persons that are well connected in the 
affected local society and such well-connected persons are often 
particularly well-versed in manipulating relations to their own 
advantage. Here, local politics may blend seamlessly into the 
politics of distributing relief and other goods and services.  
Such well-connected locals are often “trapped” in 
networks of multiple obligations which they cannot simply cut-
off while on duty for NGOs. Intermediaries, survey personnel, 
etc. will be forced to favor their own kin and community, even if 
they do not pursue any personal gain. Similarly, local power-
holders may attempt to influence an NGO’s decision of how to 
recruit such intermediaries. There may be intense competition in 
local society for positions offered by organizations.  
But “political” (i.e. susceptible to power relations and 
prone to conflicts) is not only the issue of local employees or 
intermediaries of NGOs. Also the NGO itself and its non-local 
employees and representatives are powerful, political actors; 
also when an organization denies being “political”. For many 
locals, dealing with an NGO after a disaster is a new experience. 
Azad Kashmir, for instance, was (rather briefly) opened for 
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(I)NGOs for the first time after the earthquake. New strategies 
of negotiation, discourse and representation have to be learnt 
and developed. “Political” is in particular the “interface” 
between an NGO and “the locals”, the site of encounter where 
the aims and expectations, needs and demands are negotiated. 
Some NGOs, however, also assume explicitly political roles by 
engaging in advocacy and criticizing other organizations or the 
state for not working efficiently for the needs of the affected 
people. They may channel and mobilize public protest.  
 
Power in post-disaster phases 
 
Post-disaster processes and developments are often 
conventionally divided into three phases: Rescue, relief and 
reconstruction. There is no water-tight boundary between the 
phases; they may be more or less distinct or largely overlapping 
in different cases of disaster. However, the distinction helps to 
analyze post-disaster processes. As mentioned above, such 
processes should not be understood as linear developments but 
rather as cyclical. Ultimately, reconstruction becomes a pre-
disaster phase as disaster might strike again any time.  
Rescue refers to the time immediately after the impact 
when saving lives is the imperative. The first rescue work is 
usually done by the affected people themselves, before any 
external aid arrives. Relief means the time when affected people 
depend on mostly external aid to satisfy their immediate basic 
needs, like food, water, shelter, and health. Reconstruction refers 
to the period when the affected people struggle to “return to 
normalcy”, most importantly by regaining means of livelihood 
and constructing more durable housing.  
The phase of rescue lasts for a few days only, after which 
no hope remains to drag people alive from the piles of debris 
after an earthquake, for example. The phase of relief is ideally 
also short, but often dependency on external aid lasts for a year 
or even much longer. “Reconstruction” is probably the most 
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equivocal of these designations as life can never be “re”-
constructed as it had been before the impact of a disaster. Life 
changes anyway all the time, there is no “return”. The phase of 
reconstruction may rather be characterized by profound changes 
in the arrangements of life. Reconstruction may take many 
years, especially in economically weaker countries, and it may 
never be “completed” in a literal sense.  
How are these phases related to politics? The days of 
rescue are very often described as a time where re-existing 
social structure almost ceases to exist, where affected and not-
affected people of all strata and communities cooperate in a 
highly altruistic manner to save as many lives as possible. 
Anthropologist Oliver-Smith speaks of a “postdisaster utopia”, 
hastening, however, to add that there is little utopian in the lives 
of disaster victims (1992: 4). Journalist Rebecca Solnit has 
written an entire book about such experiences which she has 
titled “A paradise built in hell” (Solnit 2009). In 
anthropological, Turnerian terminology, rescue is then 
characterized by anti-structure and communitas (Turner 1995). 
We might conclude that rescue is largely an apolitical stage but 
that would disregard the fact that the opportunities of and 
facilities for rescue largely depend on (predisaster) politics like 
the allocation of resources for disaster preparedness, for 
enabling access to remote areas, for rescue equipment, etc.  
Communitas often extends into the initial stages of relief: 
People are ready to contribute all kinds of things and services to 
affected communities. This solidarity often prevails nation-wide 
or even internationally.  Yet as relief becomes more organized, 
for instance with the advent of state agencies or humanitarian 
organizations, distribution of aid becomes frequently a matter of 
contention. Social structure surfaces again in the shape of 
inequality (Schlehe 2006). Claims and negotiations for relief are 
often backed by pre-existing or newly emerging relationships of 
power.  
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Reconstruction, finally, often implicates the distribution 
of resources on a very large scale. Assistance for reconstruction 
may be given in cash or kind. It often seems that the 
contentiousness of reconstruction is directly related to the 
amount of money spent. Yet not only the allocation of resources 
to the affected people (or to people who are not affected but 
nevertheless are able to secure their share) is highly conflictual 
and “political”. Reconstruction implies the making of policies 
and plans in which many different authorities and/or other 
agencies including international donors are involved, often with 
strongly competing ideas and interests. This is certainly a highly 
political issue which is related to the distribution of power and 
competencies among and within authorities and other 
organizations involved.   
 
Case studies: Politics of Relief and Reconstruction in 
Peru and Pakistan 
 
In what follows I will briefly present two anthropological case 
studies about disasters. The first is the massive rock avalanche 
that struck the Callejón the Huaylas in Peru in May 1970. The 
second case study refers to the much smaller Attabad landslide 
which hit Hunza in Northern Pakistan in January 2010. 
 
Case Study 1: Yungay, the “Martyred City” in the 
Peruvian Mountains  
 
On May 31, 1970 a massive earthquake shook the Andes in Peru 
and caused much destruction in the Callejón de Huaylas, a large 
valley. Yet much worse than the earthquake was what came 
after: The quake triggered a huge avalanche of ice, rocks and 
mud that came down the slope of Peru’s highest mountain, 
Mount Huascarán (6.768m), rushed through the valley, and 
erased all settlements on its way, including the provincial capital 
Yungay with 4,500 inhabitants, of 90 percent of which died in 
 
Exploring theLink between Natural Disasters and Politics 
 
15 
the avalanche. The avalanche advanced for 18 km at a speed of 
around 300 km/h. Escape was impossible. Yungay was reached 
in a few minutes. Altogether 70,000 people were killed and an 
area of the combined size of Belgium, Holland and Denmark 
was affected. In Yungay only a few people survived who 
happened to be at the highest places of the town when the 
avalanche rushed by.  
The avalanche in the Callejón de Huayalas is probably 
the best studied disaster from an anthropological perspective. 
My account largely relies on Anthony Oliver-Smiths now 
classical monograph The Martyred City (Oliver-Smith 1986).8 
Oliver-Smith started his research with survivors in Yungay 
some months after the disaster. He studied the processes of relief 
and reconstruction after the disaster. Yungay is a market place 
and administrative center of the area. The town’s society was 
characterized by strict hierarchy: Mestizos (of mixed people 
Spanish / indigenous descent) formed the largely urban upper 
class while indigenous Indians formed the largely rural lower 
class. As long as Indians did not come to close, mestizos 
regarded the Indians with a kind of benevolent paternalism 
which often, however, gave way to severe contempt.   
In the days immediately following the disaster, Oliver-
Smith found the “postdisaster utopia” to which I referred above: 
“A sense of brotherhood prevailed, cutting across both class and 
ethnic lines, prevailed as Indian and townsman, lower and upper 
class, collaborated in the efforts to obtain immediate necessities. 
(…) people implicitly understood the need for the unity and 
cooperation of all people if they were to solve the immediate 
problems of survival. Concepts of private property were 
suspended, and goods were donated to the public welfare 
without thought of payment. The individual faced problems 
                                                 
8 Beside this and many acticles by Oliver-Smith there is also the 
monograph by Barbara Bode (1980) and the unpublished PhD thesis 
by Dudasik (1978). 
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which could not be solved alone” (Oliver-Smith 1986: 76).  
Yet this brotherhood did not prevail for long. Yungay 
was cut off from the rest of Peru and only after many days 
reliable news about the catastrophe reached the capital Lima. 
Because a huge dust cloud hang over the area for days, even 
aerial reconnaissance and assessment was very difficult. Yet 
after ten days large shipments of aid started to arrive in Yungay. 
While the self-help of the disaster affectees had been 
communally oriented (food for instance was prepared in 
communal kitchens) aid was now distributed to individual 
families. Oliver-Smith observed that “this individually oriented 
aid caused many of the communally oriented adaptations of the 
emergency phase to dissolve, and people began to return to an 
improvised form of household living” (ibid., p. 87).  
Disaster aid became a focus of conflict. After two weeks, 
two tent camps were constructed at different locations of 
Yungay (Pashulpampa and Aura). The camps were organized 
separately and competition for aid ensued almost immediately 
between them. Shortly after, two more camps were established. 
Each one of the camps claimed to represent the survivors of 
Yungay and considered itself to be most worthy of receiving the 
aid pouring in (103). Also more and more people came to the 
camps from the surrounding rural areas. The organization of 
distributing aid became increasingly complex and bureaucratic. 
The affected people had to register and criteria to identify 
potential beneficiaries were established. A social and political 
distinction between “deserving” and “not-deserving” people was 
established. This implied bureaucratic procedures like applying 
for documents that had been lost in the disaster.  This was 
organized by the Committee for the Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation of the Affected Zone (CRYRZA), a government 
committee.  
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Oliver-Smith’s research focused particularly on one of 
the camps: the camp in Yungay Norte. It grew quickly and 
accommodated around 2,000 people one year after the disaster. 
Many of the camp’s inhabitants were of rural origin or belonged 
to the urban lower class. In the camps, people assumed what 
Oliver-Smith calls “disaster identities” (p. 135). Most important 
was the distinction between sobrevivientes and damnificados. 
Sobrevivientes (“survivors”) were those who had survived the 
certain death of the avalanche, while damnificados (“victims”) 
had only suffered damages of the earthquake which triggered the 
avalanche. Sobrevivientes understood themselves to be the real 
victims and also considered themselves as embodiments of 
strength and tenacity. They were mostly of urban origin in 
contrast with the largely rural damnificados (136). The 
sobrevivientes also claimed to be much more deserving of aid 
than the damnificados. To some extent, they regarded the 
damnificados as kind of imposters who had not suffered much 
damage but still tried to secure their share of incoming aid. They 
also claimed that many people attempted to pass as urban 
sobrevivientes but were in fact “mere” rural damnificados. 
Increasing hostility and conflicts between the two categories 
ensued. Hostility was furthered by projects of reconstruction that 
employed locals, mostly Indians of rural origin, who earned 
much better wages than ever before and who consequentially 
refused to work for the urban elite that paid much less. “The aid 
agencies’ wages or the nutritional support program severely 
curtailed the exploitation of Indian labor by urban center,” 
concludes Oliver-Smith (p. 138). From the urban perspective, 
traditional social structure was under threat. Many of the urban 
survivors had sources of income outside of the city and were not 
required to work. Their attitude was sharply criticized by lower-
class damnificados.  
Oliver-Smith writes that virtually all aid that reached 
Yungay was controversial in one way or another, yet no 
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program provoked as much conflict and hostility as the 
provisional shelter program of the Ministry of Housing (140). 
Many people requested for compensation in cash or construction 
materials rather than being given a constructed provisional 
shelter, but the Ministry ignored these requests. Shelters were 
allocated by young social workers who had come from outside 
of Yungay. They allocated the shelters on a first come-first serve 
basis which meant that the new shelter quarters would 
accommodate a mixed population in terms of class and origin. 
They insisted that all victims were equal and deserved equal 
assistance while the “sobrevivientes”-elite refused to move in a 
shelter where they had to live side by side with Indians. Oliver-
Smith quotes one urban survivor who said: ”I am an authentic 
Yungaíno and I want to be in the city, near the road and not up 
the hill with the peasants” (143). Many of the sobrevivientes 
never moved into the shelters they had been assigned.  
Oliver-Smith concludes: “Aid, then, stimulated friction 
and competition rather than cooperation. It continued to be an 
irritant in social interaction and community organization. While 
alleviating emergency needs in camp, aid also served as a 
catalyst for a return to an exaggerated form of pre-disaster social 
stratifications. Urban survivors saw themselves for the first time 
in competition with rural people for the basic necessities of life. 
This perception of competition stimulated an even stronger 
affirmation of urban superiority than had existed before the 
disaster. Aid was also seen in a highly political perspective. 
Those in charge of distribution were seen to favor their friends 
and political allies to the exclusion of other urban survivors with 
whom they had quarreled… Many people who ostensibly had 
little need for the articles being distributed collected them each 
time they were distributed and later sold them. Accusations of 
theft and complicity in theft by leaders ran rampant through the 
camp when aid goods were being stockpiled for distribution” 
(151f). 
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The survivors held the state agency CRYRZA 
responsible for all the difficulties they suffered. CRYRZA made 
many grand promises of aid which often did not materialize. In 
case that the agency successfully implemented a program, the 
victims only grudgingly admitted the success. Rather, they 
confronted CRYZRA with a kind of hostile cynicism. Many 
people insisted that they did not need another consignment of 
aid but opportunities for work, a loan for opening a shop or 
workshop and similar things. Oliver-Smith: “… while aid to 
Yungay helped to restore the basic material conditions of life in 
terms of shelter, food, clothing, and other necessities, the form 
and structure of delivery contributed to a deterioration of social 
relations in the community and between the community and the 
aid agencies of the government.…CRYRZA and its 
representatives became the focus of concentrated hatred and 
anger throughout the disaster zone” (159f). 
In late 1970 CRYRZA decided that Yungay and other 
towns and villages should be relocated to safer sites. In the 
affected community, these relocation plans were considered 
another disaster and the threat of relocation stimulated the 
formation of unity, purpose and cooperation among the 
survivors (201ff). The survivors said that they were not ready to 
leave their dead who were buried in the old site of Yungay. 
CRYRZA argued that the site of the town was not safe and the 
settlements should be relocated to safer places. At the same time 
Yungay’s status as provincial capital was challenged by a 
rivalling town that had not seen such a disaster. In Yungay, 
festivals like carnival and festivals of saints were used to 
mobilize support against the resettlement plans. The city 
dwellers now also tried to enlist the support of the peasants of 
the surrounding villages. There were demonstration and at 
occasions police was called to control protest. In the end, the 
protest against the relocation was successful. Resettlement was 
not called off but delayed to a time “when it was convenient and 
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necessary”. This time never came and Yungay remained in its 
place.  
Although politics is not the explicit focus of Oliver-
Smith’s study, his account bears witness of a number of 
significant political issues after disaster. There is the temporary 
suspension of social differences and their conflictual re-
instation, the conflicts about external aid which engenders 
intense competition among the affected community, and the 
controversies with state institutions about reconstruction and 
relocation. 
 
Case study 2: The Attabad landslide and political 
opposition in Gojal 
 
On 4th of January, 2010, a gigantic mass of rocks came down a 
steep slope at Attabad village in the high mountain area of 
Gilgit-Baltistan. 9  The large-scale landslide destroyed half of 
the village and filled the narrow valley of the Hunza-River. The 
debris created a huge barrier which completely blocked the flow 
of the Hunza-River and also buried the Karakorum Highway 
(KKH), the only road link into the area which also connects 
Pakistan with China. Consequently, the whole area upstream, 
the tahsil (subdistrict) of Gojal, was cut off from access to 
Pakistan. In the subsequent weeks a lake developed behind the 
barrier which continued to grow till August 2010. Until then it 
had reached a length of almost thirty kilometers. The lake 
inundated one village completely and four others partly. About 
250 families lost their houses, fields and gardens to the water. In 
Gulmit, the largest village and administrative headquarter of 
Gojal, also the main bazaar was inundated. Large sections of the  
 
 
9 Preliminary fieldwork in the affected area was undertaken for three 
brief periods in 2010, 2011 and 2012. See also Sökefeld 2012a and 
2012b. I am very grateful to the Swiss National Fund and the German 
Research Foundation for generous funding.  
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KKH came under water so that also communication between the 
villages is severely disrupted.  
The lake has grave economic consequences for Gojal. In 
the first weeks there was no transport across the lake. The area is 
not self-sufficient in terms of food and a food crisis was 
imminent. The inundation of the KKH also disrupted the 
important trade between Pakistan and China. In order to restore 
the trade to some extent, traders established a provisional 
service with wooden boats across the lake. These boats also take 
passengers and transport goods for local consumption. Yet 
transport was difficult: Below the blockade, where the KKH 
ends in the debris, goods have to be transferred from trucks to 
jeeps or tractors because the trucks cannot drive across the huge 
mountain of debris. At the other side of the blockade, the goods 
have to be loaded from the jeeps onto the boats. Because of the 
need to reload goods and change vehicles transport and also 
travel has become time consuming and very expensive. Local 
market rates in Gojal rose by around one third. Also the export 
of local produce has become difficult and expensive. Gojal is an 
agrarian high mountain region and seed potatoes are the most 
important cash crop in the region. In the past, the cultivation of 
potatoes enabled the local farmers certain prosperity. Potatoes 
are bought by traders from down country Pakistan who also 
organize their transport to the markets of the Punjab. Before the 
landslide, local farmers got up to 2,500 PKR per 100kg potatoes. 
Since the road is blocked traders offer only 700 PKR, arguing 
that due to the drastically increased transport rates they are 
unable to pay more. In consequence of the landslide, then, 
Gojalis suffer from increased costs of livelihood while at the 
same time their most important source of income fails. In fact, 
from 2011 onwards potato cultivation was greatly reduced. 
Given that also the rates for fertilizer and fuel for the tractors 
had risen sharply, cultivation was no more remunerative. Beside 
agriculture, also tourism was greatly affected by the landslide. 
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Gojal had been an important tourist destination. The lake not 
only made access to the area much more difficult, preventing the 
coming of the less adventurous tourists, but also destroyed 
infrastructure like hotels and restaurants.  
The majority of Gojalis is divided into two ethno-
linguistic groups: Wakhis, the bigger group, and Burusho, the 
minority. Both belong to the Ismailiyya. In consequence of the 
longstanding engagement of the various organizations of the 
Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) in the area there is a 
high degree of self-organization and a strong orientation towards 
education. Among the younger generation the literacy rate 
reaches hundred percent. Most parents are willing to invest 
much money in the education of their children, higher education 
included, which they regard as the most important precondition 
for a prosperous future. Therefore many young Gojalis are 
enrolled in schools, colleges and universities not only in Gilgit-
Baltistan, but also in the cities of Pakistan. After the landslide, 
as their sources of income had dried up, many parents had great 
difficulties to pay fees and boarding for their studying children, 
and some of the young Gojalis had to discontinue their 
education. Many parents told that this was the real disaster: 
Houses can be rebuilt, but a lost education cannot be recovered. 
They feel that the future of their families is at stake.   
Another significant consequence of the lake is that 
access to health services is severely impeded. There is no 
medical doctor in the whole area of Gojal. The nearest hospital 
is in Aliabad in Central Hunza which before the landslide could 
be reached within one hour. Now the trip is a great hardship in 
cases of emergency and in several instances the medical 
facilities could not be reached in time.  
There are different categories of affected people in Gojal. 
Most significantly affected are those 250 families who lost their 
homes to the lake. Because they had to move elsewhere, they are 
called IDPs (internally displaced persons). The lake produced 
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IDPs especially in three villages: in Ayeenabad, which is totally 
submerged, and in Shishkat and Gulmit, which came partly 
under water. While the IDPs of Ayeenabad and Shishkat moved 
to Central Hunza those of Gulmit were accommodated in the 
higher areas of their village. The second category of affected 
people is the “land affectees” who lost agricultural land or 
shops. The third category is the indirectly affected people who 
did not personally lose property but who suffer from the 
difficulty of access, from loss of income, etc. This is the largest 
category because it comprises the whole remnant population of 
Gojal, around 20.000 people.  
Shortly after the landslide, IDPs started to receive small 
consignments of relief items like some food, blankets and other 
household items from government and different NGOs. In 
summer 2010 China started a large relief operation and brought 
enough basic food to feed the whole of Gojal for about eight 
months. This relief was distributed equally among the whole 
population of the sub-district. In 2011, China again sent food 
relief, but this time, after an intervention of the IDPs, it was 
distributed unequally among the three categories of affectees, 
with the IDPs receiving much more than the other two 
categories.  
From the beginning, the disaster was politicized. A few 
days after the landslide, the Rabita Committee Mutasirin-e Gojal 
(Coordination Committee of the Affected People of Gojal) was 
formed in town of Gilgit, the capital of Gilgit-Baltistan. The 
Rabita Committee tried to pressurize the government for 
effective action and disaster mitigation and organized many 
events of protest against what it considered inadequate 
government efforts. Members of government, on the other hand, 
visited the area early and promised quick redress. In fact, two 
governments were involved, the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan 
and the Government of Pakistan. Gilgit-Baltistan is not a regular 
and constitutional part of Pakistan. Yet as a former part of the 
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State of Jammu and Kashmir and in consequence of the Kashmir 
dispute Gilgit-Baltistan has been under the control of Pakistan 
since 1947. Gilgit-Baltistan has no political representation in 
Pakistan; the inhabitants of the area do not have the right to vote 
for the Pakistani National Assembly. Until recently Gilgit-
Baltistan has been directly administered by Pakistan.10 In 2009, 
a reform brought a certain degree of autonomy to the area which 
is actually largely symbolic. Since then, however, Gilgit-
Baltistan has its own nominal legislative assembly and a 
government which depends on bureaucrats deputed by Pakistan 
and which in fact remains under the control of the Federal 
Government.  
In early 2010, the Federal Minister of Information, 
Qamar Zaman Qaira, was also Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan. 
Already in January he rushed to the site of the landslide and 
promised that the debris would be removed within three weeks. 
The work to cut a spillway through the debris in order to limit 
the rise of the water was given to an army engineering corps, the 
Frontier Works Organization (FWO). The debris was not 
removed and the governor returned after a few weeks only to 
repeat his promise. The local people took these promises as 
proof that the government did not take the situation seriously 
and charged the FWO with inefficiency. Whoever saw the huge 
mound of debris knew that it could not be removed within a few 
weeks. In fact, it has not been significantly reduced even after 
almost three years. Also the Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan 
visited the site and distributed small sums of relief money to the 
IDPs.  
In the time after the disaster there was a kind of 
competition between the Government(s), publicly making 
announcements to show concern, and the Rabita Committee, 
charging Government with inactivity, and organizing protest. 
 
10 For the postcolonial political history of Gilgit-Baltistan see Sökefeld 
2005. 
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Both the Government of Pakistan and the Government of Gilgit-
Baltistan belong to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). The 
disaster became a new arena of political competition. Yet while 
the arena was new, the antagonism which structured the 
competition was not.  For decades politics in Hunza and Gojal 
has been dominated by the opposition between the PPP and the 
supporters of the Mir, the erstwhile ruler of the little kingdom of 
Hunza. The Mir had kept strict control on his subjects in Gojal 
that had to render corvee labor and pay high taxes.  In the 1960s, 
some Gojalis managed to escape to Karachi where they came 
into contact with the newly founded PPP. In 1974, PPP Prime 
Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto abolished the Mir’s rule and the 
State of Hunza. Since then he is revered as a liberator by many 
families in Hunza and Gojal. Yet the Mir and his descendants 
continued to have much influence in the politics of Gilgit-
Baltistan. In Gojal, he gets support mostly from the Burusho. 
They are allied with varying factions of the Pakistan Muslim 
League (PML). Although the Rabita Committee claims to speak 
for all the people of Gojal who are affected by the landslide, it 
turns out at close inspection that the Committee was formed by 
activists and supporters of those parties that oppose the current 
PPP government of Gilgit-Baltistan, namely of the supporters of 
the Mir, mostly allied with the PML, and of the MQM, another 
party with roots in Karachi. Among other things, the Rabita 
Committee charged the Government of GB with corruption, 
claiming that in the distribution of relief the Government 
favored its own PPP-clientele.  
Hunza, Gojal included, had the reputation, cultivated by 
the people themselves, of being a politically calm region, also in 
consequence of the Aga Khan’s teaching that Ismailis should 
always be loyal to and cooperate with a given government. Yet 
after the landslide, Gojalis took to unprecedented protest 
activities. There were demonstrations in Gulmit, in Gilgit and, 
by migrants from the area, in different cities of Pakistan. In 
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summer 2010, people demonstrated with hoes and shovels at the 
blockade and started symbolically to deepen the spillway in 
order to protest against the slowness of the FWO’s work. In 
spring 2011 IDPs blocked the boat traffic by tying ropes across 
the lake and demanded disbursement of the promised 
compensation for their drowned houses. In August 2011 IPDs 
demonstrated during a visit of the Chief Minister of Gilgit-
Baltistan Aliabad, Hunza’s commercial center. Here the 
situation escalated; police shot into a group of protestors and 
killed two persons. A riot followed; many government offices in 
Hunza were stormed by protestors and set on fire. A number of 
activists were arrested. Already before, Government had tried to 
repress protest events by issuing assembly bans and threatening 
protestors with legal action.  After the Aliabad incident 
demonstrations subsided to some extent although discontent still 
prevails.  
In consequence of the unequal distribution of the second 
consignment of Chinese relief, another discord emerged in 
Gojal: the antagonism between IDPs and the rest of the 
population. While the IDPs claimed that they had suffered most 
from the landslide and therefore needed and deserved a greater 
part of the relief, others expressed the opinion that IDPs, by 
getting much aid and support, had in fact made a fortune out of 
the disaster. The IDPs formed their own committee which in 
particular negotiated with government for their resettlement and 
rehabilitation.11 The Rabita Committee charged the IDP 
Committee with pursuing their own, particularistic interest only 
while disregarding the general public, whereas the IDP 
 
11 Till today there are no plans for rehabilitation and resettlement of 
the affected families. In 2010 the Chief Minister of the Punjab made 
some vague promises to allocate land to the victims but negotiations 
of the IDP Committee with the Government of the Punjab remained 
inconclusive. Two and a half years after the landslide, the affected 
people have not yet entered a reconstruction phase in any meaningful 
sense.  
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Committee accused the Rabita Committee of not caring for the 
special needs of the IDPs.  
The Attabad disaster differs from the avalanche in the 
Callejón de Huaylas not only in scale but also because the 
inundation by the lake, although not the landslide itself, was a 
slow-onset disaster. Thus there was no sudden communitas of 
disaster but instead altruism and solidarity mostly organized 
through the Ismaili bodies. Volunteers helped the affected 
families to disassemble their houses that were threatened by the 
rising waters in order to save precious construction material and 
furnishings. Through the protests of the Rabita Committee and 
public promises made by the members of government, the 
Attabad disaster was politicized from the beginning. However, 
discord within the affected community grew with the advent of 
relief and outside assistance.  
Often, the question has been asked whether and to what 
extent disasters bring change to affected societies (eg. Olson and 
Grawonsik 2003). Recently, Henry (2011) argued that continuity 
mostly prevails. Not very surprisingly, we learn from the case of 
Attabad that there is both, continuity and change. The disaster 
did not change the fundamental power structures and conflicts in 
Gojal or Gilgit-Baltistan; rather an old antagonism was 
transferred to a new arena. Yet there is a certain change in 
political practices and attitudes. Many Gojalis emphasized that 
they had never taken to the streets before, which is not entirely 
true,12 but protests had been rather few and far between. Now 
especially the youth practiced the repertory of public protest 
quite skillfully. From discussions with local people it emerges 
that increasingly the government and its representatives are 
regarded as opponents of the local people who simply do not 
care. This is presented as contrasting the strict and rather 
                                                 
12 In 1991, for instance, Wakhis protested the curtailing of their 
grazing rights by the Khunjerab National Park by a blockade of the 
KKH (Knudsen 1999). 
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uncritical loyalty to the government which prevailed before the 
landslide. Also the reputation of the PPP has suffered greatly 
and most locals are convinced that the PPP representatives will 
not be able to succeed in the next elections. Yet the issue is not 
resolved at the time of writing. The lake is still there and 
continues to affect local life.  
 
Conclusion  
 
If there can be one - rather banal - conclusion at the end of this 
text, it is that disasters are political. Any study of disasters that 
disregards their entanglement with power relations and political 
action misses an important dimension without which, I would 
claim, disaster situations cannot be fully understood. This is also 
an important message for efforts of disaster management and 
mitigation, because they, too, need to take politics into account. 
Humanitarian intervention is never apolitical. The politics of 
humanitarian interventions (Fassin and Pandolfi 2010) is one 
area of “disaster politics” which connects the global with the 
local and which needs to be explored further. Another one is the 
consequences of disasters in ongoing conflict situations. The 
conflicts in Aceh and in Sri Lanka would make an interesting 
case for comparison. Both places with their “ethnic” conflicts 
were struck by the Indian Ocean Tsunami, yet while in Aceh the 
disaster situation contributed to a solution of the conflict, in the 
longer run it had the opposite effect in Sri Lanka.  
Finally, also the anthropological intervention in disaster 
situations has -- like all fieldwork -- political aspects. Above I 
have referred already to the problematic implications of 
questionnaires and surveys in disaster situations which may 
raise expectations that a fieldworker cannot fulfill. In any case 
we have to keep in mind that fieldwork in disaster situations 
concerns people who experience extreme distress. Imbalances of 
power between the fieldworker and his or her interlocutors 
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which are inherent in many fieldwork situations may be 
particularly significant in situations of disaster.  
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